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Abstract 
This study seeks to explore the information value in corporate governance 
reporting in a user-perspective, and will focus on the Corporate Governance Code 
issued by the Norwegian Corporate Governance Board. The thesis will hopefully 
reveal if there are gaps in what information the end-users, represented by different 
types of analysts, and what is actually provided of information by the companies. 
 
The study aims to identify if the corporate governance reporting is used, in which 
way it is used, if analysts use alternative sources and if the Norwegian Corporate 
Governance Code is sufficient in order to fulfil its purpose. The main goal of the 
thesis is to provide an insight, and hopefully be a tool in improving the Corporate 
Governance Code. 
 
Our findings reveals that there are significant differences in the perception of the 
information value of the corporate governance reporting between different kind of 
analysts, whereas investment analysts seems somewhat sceptical to this kind of 
reporting and its ability to gain market confidence. And institutional investors 
seem more actively using the reports in their analytical work, and are more in 
favour of emphasising these reports in their valuations of companies. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Corporate governance has been a discussed topic the recent years due to several 
financial scandals such as Enron and Worldcom. As a result of the economic 
setbacks in British economy in the 1970s onwards, London Stock Exchange 
launched the Cadbury Inquiry in 1990 (Davies 2006).  The outcome of this was a 
set of codes of behaviour which were issued in 1992 called The Cadbury Code 
(Nordberg 2011). The Cadbury Code had a huge impact all over the world, and 
several reports and codes were published (Appendix 1). The following year’s 
further codes emerged in UK like Greenbury Report (1995), Hampel Report 
(1998) and Turnbull Report (1999), which all lead to Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance the same year (Nordberg 2011). There were a huge 
amount of corporate scandals in the beginning of 2000, consequentially, several 
reforms were founded or revisited. The scandals have raised the need for 
increased transparency through reporting of corporate governance in order to 
improve and sustain market confidence. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) came into 
force in July 2002 in USA (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2002) and 
several corporate governance codes were introduced at other continents as well 
(Appendix 1). In UK the Higgs Report (2003) were incorporated in the Combined 
Code of Corporate Governance and it was widely copied around the world 
(Nordberg 2011). 
 
Already in 2002 Oslo Stock Exchange issued recommendations of corporate 
governance reporting for all listed companies (Oslo Stoch Exchange 2002). The 
Corporate Governance reporting became mandatory for all listed companies in 
Norway from 2005 (Oslo Stock Exchange 2005). The requirement of corporate 
governance reporting came after a significant shift in focus on transparency for 
companies caused by the financial scandals like Enron etc. The issuer of the 
Corporate Governance Code in Norway, Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 
(hereby referred to as NCGB), is responsible for providing the framework that the 
companies build their reports on, and if the framework lack aspects that the user 
find relevant, it is likely that the companies will not report what the user demand. 
If the companies avoid reporting relevant information, this will also lead to 
reduced information value for the users. So this thesis will be dedicated to identify 
if the users of the corporate governance reports are provided with the desirable 
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information, and if there is some bottleneck in information availability from the 
issuer or the companies. 
 
Figure 1 – Information flow of corporate governance (Source: Own model) 
 
This thesis is relevant for companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange since the 
research aim to reveal which information in the corporate governance reporting 
that is important for financial stakeholders. This may enable the firms to improve 
the reporting of the corporate governance or the issuer to improve the Code, in 
order to satisfy the users demand for corporate governance information. “An open 
question is whether the market is functioning enough to sanction a lower 
reporting quality and whether the economic benefits of detailed regulations 
regarding the corporate governance report will exceed the associated costs”  
(Quick and Wiemann 2011, 39). It is important to reveal if the financial 
stakeholders, represented by analysts`, are provided with the relevant and 
desirable information from the companies. This may cause awareness for the 
companies that are publishing the corporate governance reports, which may result 
in increase of relevant information that the financial stakeholders find valuable. 
NCGB have a consultation process each year where anyone can participate and 
promote their views or objections. The process is characterized by committee 
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work with representatives from the members in NCGB (see chapter 2.5). Apart 
from this, they do not have any quality assurance of the Corporate Governance 
Code or of the reports published by the companies. The empirical research of the 
quality of the Corporate Governance Code is important for the issuer, in order to 
incrementally improve the Code. This can make a fundament for improvements in 
the Code in order to provide better information for the users. 
 
1.1 Our Motivation for the Study 
Our motivation for the study is to identify if there are gaps between what is 
reported and what kind of information the stakeholders actually demand in the 
corporate governance reports. 
The development of the Corporate Governance Code has gone rapidly, and many 
sides of corporate governance reporting are not explored yet. Chizema suggests 
that as long as the codes are not put to use they present unjustified cost at both 
firm and country-levels considering the time and resources applied in designing 
them (Chizema 2011). Hence, it is important to evaluate if the end-users of the 
corporate governance reports find the information valuable.  We are not trying to 
quantifying and measure the value of information provided by the corporate 
governance reports, but we are seeking to reveal the gaps between what is 
reported and what the financial stakeholders actually finds valuable.  
 
1.2 Problem 
”The information value of corporate governance reporting for the financial 
stakeholders” 
 
 
Through this thesis we will study, analyse and determine the value of the 
information given in the corporate governance report published in annual reports 
from Norwegian listed companies. The Thesis will mainly focus on the 
shareholders, represented by the investment analysts, the creditor analysts – and 
the institutional investors. “The value of information lies solely in its ability to 
affect a behavior, decision, or outcome. A piece of information is considered 
valueless if, after receiving it, things remain unchanged.” (WebFinance Inc u.d.). 
By using the definition above, we consider the information value for the financial 
stakeholders to occur when the published corporate governance reports affect 
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behavior, decision or outcome. In other term contribute to improved insight for 
the analyst that could be utilized to increase accuracy in the analytical work.  
 
 
1.3 Limitations and Key Assumptions  
Our research will only cover the Norwegian Corporate Governance Code that is 
issued by the Norwegian Corporate Governance Board. The Code are partly 
harmonised with international codes but have certain national peculiarities 
(Norwegian Corporate Governance Board u.d.).  
 
The thesis do not seek to measure or quantify the information value, but rather to 
elucidate if there are gaps in what companies publish in the corporate governance 
reports and what practitioners demands of information in order to perform as 
accurate analysis as possible.  
 
In the research the chosen perspectives, creditor and shareholder, are covered by 
credit analysts and investment analysts. The assumption is that credit analysts are 
professionals that represent the creditors’ interests, and that investment analysts 
are professionals that represent the shareholders’ interests. The institutional 
investors are assumed to represent the shareholders’ interests.  
 
We use the words codes, code of practice, recommendations interchangeably in 
the thesis. 
 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
There are several different definitions of corporate governance. “Corporate 
governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997, 737). This definition focuses on a shareholder perspective and does not take 
into account the stakeholders of the corporations. The definition provided by 
Tirole states that corporate governance concerns the design of institutions that 
induce or force managers to internalize the welfare of stakeholders (Tirole 2001). 
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This is, in contrast to the first definition, seen in a stakeholder perspective. A more 
holistic way of defining the corporate governance concept is provided by 
Cadbury: 
 
“Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic 
and social goals. The governance framework is there to encourage the efficient 
use of resources and equally to require accountability for stewardship of those 
resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society.” (Claessens and Cadbury 2003, vii). 
 
There are as presented above, several approaches and definitions of corporate 
governance. The NCGB states that “The purpose of the Code of Practice is to 
clarify the respective roles of shareholders, board of directors and executive 
officers beyond the requirements of the legislation.” (Norwegian Corporate 
Governance Board u.d.). This indicates that NCGB have a shareholder approach. 
On the other hand NCGB states that “The Code of Practice is intended to 
strengthen confidence in companies and to enhance the greatest possible value 
creation over time in the best interests of shareholders, employees and other 
stakeholders.” (Norwegian Corporate Governance Board u.d.), this seems 
somewhat ambiguous since they take into account other stakeholders as well. The 
most appropriate definition to use according to the research question may be the 
one Cadbury presented.  This is because we take into account both stakeholders, 
represented by analysts, and shareholders that base their decisions on the 
analytical work. 
3.2 Corporate Governance Codes 
The corporate governance codes are rules, recommendations and sets of business 
best practices (Akkermans, et al. 2007).  There exists several different definition 
of corporate governance codes, and one of the most quoted definitions is Aguilera 
and Cuervo-Cazurra’s; “Codes of good governance are set of ‘best practices’ 
recommendations regarding the behaviour and structure of the board of directors 
of a firm” (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004, 417). 
 
The objective of corporate governance codes vary from country or scope, since 
the national adoptions have different laws and business structures. According to 
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Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, the two main objectives of corporate governance 
codes are to improve the quality of companies’ board governance and increase the 
accountability of companies to shareholders while maximizing shareholder or 
stakeholder value (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004). Other researchers define 
corporate governance codes as systems of enhance the quality and transparency of 
management, thereby improving company performance and restoring investors’ 
confidence (Akkermans, et al. 2007). The focus differs between researchers, and 
the Norwegian Code is most in accordance with the definition by Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, since the Norwegian Code is focus on maximizing the 
shareholder value (Norwegian Corporate Governance Board u.d.). 
 
Corporate governance codes can be adapted to meet the international 
development, or be more national-oriented to satisfy the specific national 
corporate laws. The issuer of national codes could choose to be more accordance 
with the national law system and regulatory system, or to construct the codes to 
harmonize with international developments. Despite the differences between 
specific national peculiarities and the international universality, the national codes 
are remarkably similar (Cromme 2005). The explanation can be arguments of 
efficiency and legitimacy that influence national issuers to reach for 
harmonization (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004). The Norwegian Code are not 
considerably different from other codes, but NCGB have adjusted to national 
characteristics, such as female representation in the board and specific 
requirements in the Norwegian Corporate Law. The process where national 
issuers of codes imitate the corporate governance codes of other countries is 
called mimetic isomorphism, in other words; when an issuer of corporate 
governance codes imitates another issuer because it appears to be beneficial. This 
might entail institutional isomorphism, and this will lead to more similarities and 
internationalization of the codes (Chizema 2011). Some authors even argue that 
uncertainty is a powerful incentive for imitation. In particular, ambiguous goals, 
poorly understood technologies or symbolic uncertainty could result in countries 
to model the codes after other countries that consider their codes for being 
successful (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This could result in codes with low 
quality and low adaptation to unique national features, and reducing the 
information value for the users of corporate governance codes. The Norwegian 
Code appears quite similar to other codes; however, some national peculiarities 
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have been added. It is not known how much of the Norwegian Code that are 
imitated from other issuers, but it is obvious that the NCGB have not developed 
the Norwegian Code solidly on its own without any influence from other issuers.  
The hegemony of development of the codes has been on the Anglo-American 
principles of corporate governance, and has not been a subject to intense 
competition (Chizema 2011). The main reason for the development of similar 
corporate governance is that globalization of financial markets and products have 
forced the capital markets to harmonize internationally (Chizema 2011). On the 
other hand, others argue that the cross-national differences are significant, and the 
codes vary greatly because they are developed to address corporate governance 
issues that are specific to a particular country (Lucia and Liliana 2010). The 
variation between countries capital markets is also emphasised as a potential 
reason for cross-national differences, since more sophisticated capital markets 
require more advanced codes recommendations (Lucia and Liliana 2010). In 
addition, transnational organizations such as the World Bank and OECD actively 
work for promoting governance by helping developing countries understand how 
to improve corporate governance practices (Lucia and Liliana 2010). The NCGB 
have not published what kind of sources they have used in their development of 
the Norwegian Code, but it is fair to assume that they have done some sort of 
benchmark or comparison with other codes or practises from other countries or 
institutions.  
 
The implementation of corporate governance codes varies significantly between 
nations, and the quasi-legal format of the codes requires a market environment 
where actors, agents and principals interact and evaluate each other’s’ choices 
(Feleaga, Voicu and Feleaga 2009). The NCGB annually have a consultation 
process where anyone that is interested could send in suggestions, additional 
requests or objections. This is the only form for evaluation process the Norwegian 
Code faces. The challenge with introducing corporate governance codes in a 
country is that soft laws does not have the option to immediate sanctions on 
deviations such as hard law have with a functional legal system. However, if 
business partners consider deviations of the corporate governance codes as a 
reputation loss, and therefore not worthy of doing business with, the companies 
might find it as a market sanction (Feleaga, Voicu and Feleaga 2009). Several 
researchers have raised the question about the effectiveness of market sanctions, 
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and whether the market is functioning enough to sanction a lower reporting 
quality and whether the economic benefits of detailed regulations regarding the 
corporate governance report will exceed the associated costs (Quick and Wiemann 
2011). The question about market effectiveness regarding sanctions of companies 
that have low quality on their corporate governance reports might be a fair 
question to raise in this research paper, since the literature is inconclusive 
regarding this question. An increasing numbers of companies have begun to view 
high-quality corporate governance as an importantly competitive tool (Pae and 
Choi 2011). Whether this is the case in Norway is unknown, and will be an 
appropriate question to examine, since a perception of corporate governance 
reporting as a competitive tool might lead to high quality reporting. 
Implementation of codes has increased over time, firms tend to adopt a growing 
percentage of codes recommendations despite their voluntary nature, and 
nevertheless the decision to adapt to a code does not give an automatically 
guarantee of effective corporate governance (Lucia and Liliana 2010). Some 
researcher claims that the codes could be adopted at country-level, but the 
effectiveness of these codes lies in their implementation at firm-level, thus the 
ownership structure is a strong determinant in either the adoption or rejection of 
governance elements by the firm (Chizema 2011). Research findings in Germany 
suggests that for instants that state and bank ownership may be associated with 
lower levels of implementation, while the opposite is expected for institutional 
ownership (Chizema 2011). These findings would be an interesting approach for 
our research, since the Norwegian Stock Exchange are dominated by partly state 
owned/controlled companies, and the ownership structure might influence the 
quality of corporate governance reporting.  In relation to implementation of codes 
one fair question is if the codes are used in the purpose and intention they were set 
up to. It might be symbolic adoption at the minimum or well-meant adoption at 
country level which is not matching by an equal response by individual firms 
especially at the implementation phase (Chizema 2011). Some researchers claim 
that the compliance increases with company size (Akkermans, et al. 2007), thus 
the level of implementation might be determined by financial resources and 
internal competence. In relation to the Norwegian Code the correlation between 
implementation of corporate governance reporting and size would suggest that 
implementation rate for Norwegian companies is low, since Norwegian 
companies that are listed are small compared to other countries. Some corporate 
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representatives feel that good corporate governance may outweigh the benefits 
since the investors do not care about corporate governance practice when 
determining stock prices, and this view on corporate governance 
recommendations as not value maximization could lead to lower levels of 
implementation of the codes (Cheung, et al. 2007). 
 
2.3 Agency Theory 
To be able to understand the issues addressed in the codes we will present some 
theories of the underlying issues. The most important one is the well-known 
agency theory. Another issue that is important in the codes are independence 
which is referred to in six of the fifteen chapters in the Norwegian Corporate 
Governance Code. 
The agency theory is based on the interactions between one or more principals and 
the agent that perform a service on behalf of the principal(s). An agency cost 
occurs when the agent want to perform the service in a different way than the 
principal(s) (Jensen og Meckling 1976).There might be significant conflicts of 
interest which can be costly for the principal(s). This can be recognized as 
information asymmetry and occurs when one of the parties have more information 
than the other. The ideal situation will be that a contract is signed between the 
principal (financiers) and the agent (manager), this will specify exactly what the 
managers does in every possible scenario, and how the profits are allocated 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). This will though be too expensive and comprehensive 
to do. It is also hard to predict what is going to happen in the future because of the 
uncertainty in the market. Another issue that Shleifer and Vishny identifies is that 
the principal (financiers) get to decide what to do if  something unexpected is 
happening in the firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In practice this will not work 
because of missing competence and expertice of the principal. That`s the reason 
why they hire a manager to do the job in the first place.  
In this thesis the creditors` represented by the credit analysts and the shareholders` 
represented by the investment analysts should be seen as the principals and the 
company represented by their managers should be seen as the agents. We will also 
take into account institutional investors which invest directly in shares at Oslo 
Stock Exchange on behalf of their fund investors. 
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An essential risk for the creditors when providing financing is the probability of 
bankruptcy costs. In many cases of possible bankruptcy the creditors and 
managers will have different risk profiles. The creditors will avoid the downside 
rather than the possibilities of a large upside. This might lead to different focus of 
corporate governance between these two different stakeholders. It may imply that 
the credit analysts value the information about e.g. “Risk management and 
internal control” in the Corporate Governance Code. This is contrary from the 
shareholder perspective where the benefits lie in the potential upside. The 
shareholders expect that the managers allocates the resources efficiently at the 
same time that they expect a high return on their investments. This may imply that 
the investment analysts value the topic e.g. “Equity and dividends” in the 
Corporate Governance Code. 
 
2.4 Independence 
There are several issues that are covered in the “The Code of Practice”. The most 
discussed topic is “Independence” which is covered in chapter 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 
14. The most used argument for independence is that it protects the interests of the 
shareholders. It should also provide an outside view and different aspects around 
different topics and issues so that the company will perform the best for the 
shareholders. The major field within independence is concerned with the board 
structure, but it is also concerned with the nomination committee and the 
corporate assembly in the “Norwegian Code of Practice”. There are several 
empirical research findings regarding this subject area, and the results vary 
significantly. Rosenstein and Wyatt found that “the addition of an outside director 
in the board increased firm value” (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990, 190). Garcia-
Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta found that the information reported by firms was 
improved by the recommendation regarding board independence introduced by 
The Code of Best Practice (Garcia-Meca and Sanches-Ballesta 2010).  Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt found that earnings management was less likely to occur in 
companies with boards that included more independent outside directors (Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt 2003). Bhagat and Bolton finds that operating performance 
is positively effected by greater board independence in the period 2003-2007, in 
this period they also finds that ROA is positively and significantly effected by 
independence. In the period 1998-2002 they finds that independence is negatively 
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related to ROA (Bhagat and Bolton 2009). This are positive effects of the 
independence area in corporate governance. In a research made by Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein in 2007 where they measured the impact of the 2002  governance 
rules, they found that board and committee independece had a positive impact on 
medium and large firms (Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007).  A finding that is 
closely related to this paper is the findings from Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and 
LaFound, they found that firms credit rating was positively related to overall 
board independence (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond 2006). There are as 
presented in this section several arguments and research findings of positive 
effects of independence, but there are also some researchers that arguments for 
negative effects regarding independence. Bhagat and Black did not find any 
evidence that greater board independence led to improved firm performance 
(Bhagat and Black, Leeds School of Business 2000). Hermalin and Weisbach 
found no relation between board composition and performance with the 
explaination that the shareholders` interests are represented equally bad (or 
possible good) by  inside and outside directors (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991). 
There are varied research results regarding independence and performance, but 
most of the research results suggest that independence have a positive impact.  
2.5 Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 
The Norwegian Corporate Governance Board was established by Oslo Stock 
Exchange and issued the first edition of the Norwegian Corporate Governance 
Codes in 2004  (Strøm 2008). NCGB is responsible for publishing the Corporate 
Governance Code that all listed companies at OSE are obliged to follow. The 
listed companies compliance with the Corporate Governance Code must be in 
accordance with the principles of comply or explain, in other terms companies can 
refrain from the Corporate Governance Code, but in that case they have to explain 
why they do not want to comply. The Corporate Governance Code is a part of 
Oslo Stock Exchange listing rules for equities. Listing rule number 32 states that: 
“Confirmation that the company complies with the Norwegian Code of Practice 
for Corporate Governance. If the company does not comply with the Norwegian 
Code of Practice for Corporate Governance in any respect, the reason for the 
deviation must be explained.” (Oslo Stock Exchange 2012). NCGB was 
established by nine organizations; Norwegian Shareholders Association, 
Norwegian Institute of Public Accountants, Institutional Investor Forum, Finance 
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Norway, Norwegian Society of Financial Analysts, Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise, Norwegian Association of Private Pension Funds, Oslo Stock 
Exchange, Norwegian Mutual Fund Association. The board is currently led by 
Ingebjørg Harto, and Halvor E. Sigurdsen provides secretariat services to the 
board (Norwegian Corporate Governance Board n.d.).The Corporate Governance 
Code is categorized into 15 major topics (Appendix 2), and each topic 
distinguishes between recommendations that are optional and the Codes of 
Practice that is required. The requirements are obtained with the term “should”, 
and where the Corporate Governance Code refers to requirements imposed by 
legislations, the term “must” is used. 
 
2.6 National Characteristics  
The Corporate Governance Code are adapted to the Norwegian corporate laws and 
other national peculiarities, hence the Corporate Governance Code are in 
accordance with unique features of Norwegian corporate law. The Norwegian 
Corporate Governance Code take into account that for companies with more than 
200 employees must elect a corporate assembly with at least 12 members of which 
2/3 are elected by shareholders and 1/3 are elected by the employees. The 
mandate for the corporate assembly is supervision, issuing options and decision-
making. In companies with more than 30 employees, the employees have the right 
to be represented on the board of directors. When it comes to the composition of 
the board, there are requirements in terms of gender of its members. The chief 
executive of a company cannot be a member of its board of directors (Norwegian 
Corporate Governance Board 2010). These are distinct features with Norwegian 
Corporate Law that Corporate Governance Code have taken into consideration, 
and it is important to be aware of in any comparison with Corporate Governance 
Code from other countries.  
 
2.7 Hard Law and Soft Law 
“Hard law refers to legal obligations of a formally binding nature, while soft 
law refers to those that are not formally binding but may nonetheless lead to 
binding hard law.” (Shaffer and Pollack 2010, 707) 
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The Norwegian Corporate Governance Code is seen as a soft law document. It is 
not a binding law but it is based on comply or explain approach. However, the 
companies must give a comprehensive corporate governance statement according 
to the Norwegian Corporate Governance Code. This is followed up by Oslo Stock 
Exchange since the Norwegian Corporate Governance Code is implemented in 
their “Admission Requirements” and in their “Continuing Obligations” (Oslo 
Stock Exchange 2012). The company laws are seen as hard laws and are 
implemented in the Norwegian Laws. Skjærseth, Stokke and Wettestad finds that 
it is more easily to achieve ambitious norms in soft law institutions than in legally 
binding institutions (Skjærseth, Stokke and Wettestad 2006). 
2.8 Comply or Explain 
The Norwegian Corporate Governance Codes are as mentioned different 
compared to the mandatory requirement of SOX. The codes have a comply-or-
explain framework where the companies listed on Oslo Stock Exchange have to 
comply with the codes or explain why they chose not to. This approach is aiming 
to get the companies to adopt the spirit of the codes and not only what is written 
in the codes (Arcot, Bruno and Faure-Grimaud 2010). Since the companies can 
chose to comply with the codes it is important that they explain clearly if they do 
not comply. If the explaination is vague the market may lose some of the 
confidence to what is reported, especially if the company chose to differ from the 
same subject in the codes several times. Since there are no formal authority that 
monitors what is reported, it is expected that the reporting varies a lot, hence, the 
explaination should also be expected to vary. Oslo Stock Exchange only monitor 
if the companies reporting is satisfactory but they do not monitor the quality of the 
reports, so the companies can manage to report with the required minimum (Oslo 
Stock Exchange 2012). In Oslo Stock Exchange Circular no. 2/2006 it is stated 
that “Company statements are expected to be particularly detailed when dealing 
with any areas where the company does not comply with the recommendation, 
and must also explain the reasons for non-compliance” (Oslo Stock Exchange 
2006, 2). Oslo Stock Exchange emphasises that companies must report detailed, 
especially if they do not comply, but there are several interpretations of what is 
considered as detailed, hence the reporting may be of low quality.  
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Arcot, Bruno and Faure-Grimaud finds an increase in average compliance per 
principle from 76,7% in 1998 to 91,4% in 2004, which indicates that companies 
strives to implement the codes. They also found evidence of an average of 17% of 
non-explained cases in 2004 among the non-compliance issues (Arcot, Bruno and 
Faure-Grimaud 2010). The trend in the research period from 1998-2004 was 
relative constant with a small decrease. Since the compliance have increased in 
this period and the non-explained cases have decreased in this period, it should be 
expected that this have changed even more in this period where the focus on 
corporate governance codes have been even greater.  
 
Kragh-Schwarz made a slightly different research to see if the comply or explain 
approach worked sufficiently. The sample was 24 listed companies in Denmark. 
The results showed that about 90% of the recommendations in the Corporate 
Governance Code were followed (Kragh-Schwarz 2007). This may indicate that 
the “comply or explain” approach is working even if this does not take into 
account which codes that are not followed. When it comes to the quality of what 
is reported, Ernst & Young Norway publishes an annual report where they 
measure the quality of the reporting of every listed company on Oslo Stock 
Exchange and also some other unlisted companies that follows the codes. This is a 
subjective measure and operationalized with a range from 1-6, where six is the 
best grade. The companies’ have a score of 3.2 on average in 2011 which is an 
increase from the 2010 grade of 3.1 (Earnst & Young 2011). This indicates that 
some companies are reporting satisfactory but that there are a substantial potential 
for improvement. 
 
3.0 Method 
Within the corporate governance recommendations it is possible to focus on 
different parts of the information chain, such as the issued codes, company’s 
corporate governance reports or user-perspective. This thesis will mainly focus 
on the user-perspective, and the practitioners’ perception of the corporate 
governance reports. The thesis aims to reveal the users perception of the 
information value based on their expertise gained from the use of corporate 
governance reports in their daily work. By gathering data from the users of 
corporate governance reports, we expect to get the most correct and unbiased data, 
since the users have incentives to answer the questions honestly, because they are 
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dependent of exact and accurate information. This might not be the case for the 
companies, since it is possible that they do not have incentives of requiring more 
comprehensive corporate governance reporting, because it might potentially lead 
to more additional work.  
 
Figure 2 - The research design 
 
In order to answer the research question it is necessary to use scientifically 
accepted methods. Through the literature search it became clear that the 
evaluation of corporate governance codes had few research findings. Thus, there 
are no “a priori” opinions or pre-hypothesis that is possible to draw from existing 
literature. It will consequentially be appropriate to use an explorative research 
design. The research design will be based on mixed methods designs, which 
involves collecting data to both quantitative and qualitative methods (Creswell 
2005). The methods that will be used are: 
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1. Quantitative research method - Survey  
2. Qualitative research method – In-depth interviews 
 
 
Figure 3 - Decision tree for mixed methods design criteria for timing, weighting, and mixing. 
Source: Based on (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007, 80). 
 
The different methods will be completed sequential in order to gain insight 
through the survey before we go in depth of the research question. The 
quantitative method will be essential to build a broader understanding of the topic, 
and it will be used as a fundament in producing the interview guide, and 
narrowing the research problem. The purpose of the survey would be to collect 
data to be able to understand the scope of the topic from an analyst perspective. 
The survey would give input and an overview that would be crucial to create an 
interview guide that would contribute to answer the research question. This kind 
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of approach with mixed methods is defined as explanatory design analysis (J. W. 
Creswell 2005). The thesis will emphasise the qualitative research method since 
the purpose is to reveal the information value of corporate governance reporting in 
Norway in a user-perspective, which is a relatively unexplored topic.  
 
3.1 Data Collection 
The collection of data was conducted sequentially and in both cases it is first hand 
data. Both the survey and the in-depth interviews were based on the samples from 
pre-chosen financial institutions. This gave opportunities to distinguish 
perspectives in separately populations enabling us to investigate if there were 
significant differences in perception of the information value in the corporate 
governance reporting between the financial stakeholders. In the in-depth 
interviews we examined if there was differences in the stakeholder perspectives 
by interviewing two investment analysts and two institutional investors. 
 
3.2 Quantitative Research Design 
To get a better understanding of the underlying practitioners’ perception of 
information value of corporate governance reporting, it is necessary to use a 
survey to extract descriptive statistics and statements from the financial 
stakeholders’ perspectives. This will be used to identify the relevant aspects of the 
corporate governance reporting for financial stakeholders before we go deeper 
into the subject by in-depth interviews. In the survey, the respondents will be 
asked if the information provided by the corporate governance reports is valuable 
in their analytical work. It is necessary to reveal which parts of the corporate 
governance codes that have valuable information for the users. In cases where the 
respondent claim low information value, they receive an open follow-up question 
why they consider the information value to be low. The purpose of the survey 
would not be to generate any hypothesis or to statistically generalize. It will only 
be used to gather information to elucidate analysts’ opinions about the 
information value of the Corporate Governance Code. The survey was design to 
capture the view of the analysts about the information value the different chapters 
represents for their analysis of listed companies. The survey started to identify 
some background info about the respondent, such as: gender, age, company, years 
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of education and analytical perspective. The reason for these questions is that the 
dataset should contain dummy variables so it is possible to statistically check for 
patterns related to the response in relations to the dummy variables. In order to 
systematically go through the codes issued by NCGB, the questions was 
operationalized by the chronological chapters the codes are presented in, and 
mandatory questions about the addressed chapter/topic and if the analyst consider 
the information valuable for his/her analysis (YES or NO). The start of the 
question was a short introduction to the contents in the codes to make sure the 
respondents knew what the information should be about in the corporate 
governance reports to listed companies. In case of YES, the respondent got a 
following up-question about if the information is sufficient for the analysis 
operationalized in a Likert scale. The next questions was if the respondent use 
other sources of information to analyse the same topic that the chapter is 
addressing, and this was an open question where the respondent had to type in a 
qualitative answer. In case of the respondent replaying NO in the question about if 
the chapter/topic is valuable in the analysis; the following question was why the 
analyst considers the information as irrelevant for the analysis. This was 
operationalized as an open question where the respondent had to type in a 
qualitative answer. This structure was performed throughout the fifteen different 
chapters/topics in the corporate governance code. The assumption in the survey 
design is that the structure should contribute to get a better understanding of the 
analysts’ perception of the information value in different chapters of the Corporate 
Governance Code, and to use the findings to develop an interview guide. 
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Figure 4 - Design of the question structure in the survey asked for each chapter 
3.3 Sampling for the Survey 
The survey was based on nonprobability sampling because the respondents had a 
desirable characteristics that we seek to study (J. W. Creswell 2005). The 
approach will be purposive sampling, meaning that the sample is recruited based 
on the assumption that the respondents have the expertise in the area that we 
study. To reach the desirable respondents for the study; we have gathered names 
of analysts` that follows listed companies on Oslo Stock Exchange. The contact 
information has been gathered from the listed companies’ webpage where the 
companies publish the analyst coverage. This practice by publishing lists of 
covering analysts by listed companies made potential respondents accessible with 
email-addresses. The sample was stratified into two populations; credit analysts 
and investment analysts. To ensure that we recruited analysts with expertise on the 
Norwegian Corporate Governance Codes all Non-Norwegian analysts was 
excluded from the sample. The distribution of the survey was done with an online 
survey-provider (questback.no) where the survey was built in their online system 
and distributed to the sample with adding email-addresses into the online survey. 
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The survey was first sent out to the whole sample, and had two reminders sent out 
successively with a week’s delay to all participants in the survey sample. The 
survey was conducted anonymously and the participants were guaranteed a 
scientifically ethical use of the data provided.  
 
3.4 Qualitative Research Design  
Based on the information gathered in the survey we used a semi-structured in-
depth interview with practitioners to get a better understanding of, and to be able 
to answer, the research question. We are aiming to elucidate the value of the 
information for the financial stakeholders, and not to measure the value and the 
variables of the governance reporting. Based on the existing literature on the topic 
there are no conclusive hypothesis that are possible to use in a quantitative 
research design. Thus, qualitative methods will be helpful to achieve insight on 
the corporate governance reporting.  
 
3.5 Sampling for the Qualitative In-Depth Interviews 
The population in the qualitative study was users of the corporate governance 
reporting and the target population was the users within the selected firms. The 
sample was the participants in the in-depth interviews recruited based on 
purposive sampling, and the characteristic of the respondents were that they 
worked as senior advisors for their analysts departments in their respective 
companies (J. W. Creswell 2005). They are expected to have the expertise within 
the use of corporate governance reporting in analytical work. The two investment 
analysts and institutional investors are targeted from Carnegie, ABG Sundal 
Collier, KLP and Government Pension Fund of Norway. 
 
Carnegie is an investment bank which is stationed in Stockholm. It has two 
subsidiaries; Carnegie ASA and Carnegie Kapitalforvaltning AS that operates in 
Norway with own license (Carnegie Holding AB 2011). The important area for 
the thesis is the analytical area which follows about 300 Nordic companies, this 
range to about 95% of the market value on the Nordic market (Carnegie 2012). 
 
Master Thesis in GRA 19003  01.09.2012 
Page 21 
Kommunal Landspensjonskasse, or KLP, is Norway`s largest life insurance 
company. It is an institutional entity owned by municipalities and counties, health 
authorities and companies. The entire group has total assets of 315 billion 
Norwegian kroner. KLP has two whole owned subsidiaries that make this 
company interesting for our research; KLP Fondsforvaltning AS and KLP 
Kapitalforvaltning AS. These two work closely together with investment 
management (KLP 2012). 
 
Government Pension Fund of Norway is an institutional entity. It manages both 
the State Pension Found Norway and the State Bond Found in Norway.  They 
have a target of 80-90 percent of the share portfolio and the fixed income portfolio 
invested in Norway while the rest should be invested in Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden (Government Pension Fund of Norway 2012). They have an invested 
market value of 73 570 000 000 in Norway which is divided on several companies 
in different sectors. 
 
ABG Sundal Collier is a Nordic investment bank listed on Oslo Stock Exchange. 
They earn 48% of their revenue in Norway.  The whole revenue is derived from 
two entities; corporate finance with 45% and brokerage services 55%.  The market 
value of ABG Sundal Collier retrieved from Oslo Stock Exchange is per 
11.07.2012, about 1493 million Norwegian kroner (ABG Sundal Collier 2011). 
 
4.0 Data from the Survey  
4.1 Feedback and Data Cleansing 
The survey gave the respondents the option to reject the survey with withdrawal 
from further reminders. Four participants used this option and rejected the survey 
without stating any reason for this. 18 of the participants that were emailed 
generated a default auto replay with notice about ended employment. One 
respondent wrote in the comment field that he/she had answered systematically 
things that did not represent his/her real opinion in order to sabotage our dataset, 
and therefore we had to exclude this response from the dataset in order to ensure 
consistency and reliability. We also received email from one participant that 
notified that he found the survey being too comprehensive and time-consuming, 
and suggested a shorter survey in order to increase the response rate.  
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics from the Survey  
As table 1 show, the total number in the sample is 183 persons. The respondent 
rate was 7.7% which might be expected with this type of data collection.  
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
Reasons for low response rate might be following; the participants did not have 
time, thought that it was too time-consuming, the survey was filtered out as spam, 
instructions not to answer from their employer, not willing to use time on non-
profit activities or just lack of competence on the topic.  
4.3 Presentation of the Data from the Survey 
In this part we will present the results of the survey and the comments that are 
connected to each of the topics in The Corporate Governance Code. The survey is 
crucial to capture potential gaps between the information value of what is 
provided through the corporate governance reports and what the users’ demand of 
valuable information. It is appropriate to follow The Norwegian Codes’ structure, 
since some parts could have high degree of information value and others have low 
degree of information value. To go through each chapter of the Codes will give a 
necessary insight of the user’s perception of The Corporate Governance Code’s 
information value, the use of the information and alternative sources. The 
gathered data will be essential in understanding underlying issues, and will be 
useful in creating an accurate interview guide for the qualitative research. 
 
4.3.1 Chapter 1: Implementation and Reporting on Corporate Governance 
This chapter concerns the fact that the boards must ensure that the companies’ 
implements sound corporate governance and that they must provide a corporate 
governance report. The board should also define the company`s basic corporate 
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values, ethical guidelines and guidelines for corporate social responsibility 
(Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 2010). 
The results from the survey indicate that the majority (57.1%) of the investment 
analysts find this information valuable while the credit analysts are divided in 
their opinion. 
 
Graph 1 - Implementation and reporting on corporate governance 
The respondents that found this information valuable have found this information 
relatively sufficient for their analysis work.  This shows that what is reported 
actually is important for many of the stakeholders, but over 40% of the 
respondents did not find the information useful.  
 
Graph 2 - Implementation and reporting on corporate governance 
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The comments that were submitted in relation to this were; “Because what’s 
standing there is not regarded as reliable for me. A company with really bad 
corporate governance may present the corporate governance/corporate culture in 
great terms in the annual report even if that is not the case. The companies that 
describe themselves as the best may probably just as well be the worst”. 
 
“The value of the reporting varies from case to case but that it is seldom vital for 
the analysis.” 
 
Another respondent says that he/she assumes that the reporting is there and that it 
is okay so he/she does not take the time to check. 
The comments provided on this chapter by the respondents indicates that the 
reports that the listed companies issues are not reliable. It also indicates that what 
is reported and what the companies actually do in fact do not match in all cases. 
 
To the question whether the respondents used other sources to obtain the same 
information, the respondents answered that they used meetings with management 
and board, other stakeholders and investor relations.  
 
 
4.3.2 Chapter 2: Business 
The next chapter concerns the business and that it should be clearly defined and 
that the company should have clear objectives and strategy within this definition 
in its articles of association. This should also be implemented in the annual report 
(Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 2010). 
. 
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Graph 3 - Business 
Compared to the first chapter, this one has an equal weight on the answer if the 
governance reports are valuable for their analysis. The weight on the sufficiency 
for the participants answering “yes” replies that the information is relatively 
sufficient indicates that the information is valuable.   
 
Graph 4 - Business 
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The respondents did also answer that they found the information in other sources, 
such as company management, company presentations, quarterly presentations 
and other unnamed sources. These submissions indicate that the information is 
also easily accessible through other sources. One respondent answered that he/she 
knew the business by definition, indicating that this information is not that 
valuable for analysts.  
 
4.3.3 Chapter 3: Equity and Dividends 
This chapter concerns the equity and dividend policy. The company should have 
an equity capital at a level appropriate to its objective while the dividend policy 
should be clear and predictable (Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 2010). 
This chapter was expected to have information that was valuable for credit 
analysts and the result of almost 80% finding this valuable indicates this. Both the 
credit analysts did also find this valuable.  
 
 
Graph 5 - Equity and dividends 
 
The next question also indicates that the information is sufficient for their use, 
with over 50% answering 4 and about 35% answered 5 on the scale. 
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Graph 6 - Equity and dividends 
 
Other sources that were used by the respondents were company management, 
quarterly reports, capital markets day material, banks and annual report. These 
results indicates as mentioned that the information provided is very useful for 
analysts but that there are several other reports and sources that is used to get this 
information. 
 
 
4.3.4 Chapter 4: Equal Treatment of Shareholders and Transactions with 
Close Associates 
This chapter of the Corporate Governance Codes recommend that the company 
only have one class of shares, that the pre-emption rights must be protected in 
case of an increase of share capital. The increase in share capital must be justified 
and announced through the stock exchange. All transactions between the company 
and close associates should be valued by an independent party (Norwegian 
Corporate Governance Board 2010). 
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Graph 7 - Equal treatment of shareholders and transactions with close associates 
 
The results indicate that the information is valuable for the majority of the 
investment analyst while both the credit analysts find the information irrelevant.  
Most of the analysts find the information provided by the reporting relative 
sufficient. Over 60% have answered four and about 25% have answered five, 
while slightly over 10% have answered two.  
Other sources that are used to get this information based on the open question are 
company management, news releases and interim reports. A more interesting 
result is the answers on the open question on why the information is irrelevant. 
One of the answers was: “I do not consider this information as irrelevant. I would 
rather say that the information in the CGR is not comprehensive enough in this 
regard”. This indicates that the information that the companies report is not good 
enough to satisfy the need for information. Other answers that were submitted 
through the survey were; this is minimum requirement and that the actions speak 
louder than words. This indicates that the information provided by the company 
does not always match with the reality or that the information is too vague and 
general.  
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Graph 8 - Equal treatment of shareholders and transactions with close associates 
 
 
4.3.5 Chapter 5: Freely Negotiable Shares 
The company’s shares must, in principle, be freely negotiable. 
Therefore, no form of restriction on negotiability should be included 
in a company’s articles of association (Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 
2010). This seems to be very important for most of the respondents with a rate of 
almost 65%. 
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Graph 9 - Freely negotiable shares 
 
The respondents finds this information relative sufficient with a response rate on 
about 65% on the fourth alternative and over 20% on the fifth alternative. 
 
Graph 10 - Freely negotiable shares 
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Some of the respondents did also use other sources to get the same information, 
like the annual report and the company management. One of the respondents 
answered that “listed shares are by definition freely negotiable”, which is in a 
way true for most of the shares, but the listed companies may differ from the 
requirement about freely negotiable shares by having restriction in the articles of 
association. The legal title for these deviations follows from the Norwegian 
Corporate Laws, cf. asal § 4-16 (Lovdata n.d.).  
 
4.3.6 Chapter 6: General Meetings 
The board of directors should take steps to ensure that as many shareholders as 
possible may exercise their rights by participating in general meetings of the 
company. Shareholders who cannot attend the meeting in person should be given 
the opportunity to vote (Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 2010). This is 
the most important from chapter six in the Corporate Governance Codes. The 
majority of the analysts, with a percentage of almost 60%, have answered that this 
information is not valuable for their analysis work. The answer on the question 
why the information is irrelevant was that “it does not impact the valuation of a 
company” and that “it is usually not a focus when doing a credit analysis of a 
company”. Other answers that were posted was that “it is mandatory anyway” 
and “that the annual general meeting is protected by shareholder rights and the 
company have to issue a separate invitation to all the shareholders.” This is of 
course right and regulated by the law, but there are many adaptions the company 
can do to ensure that most of the shareholders may participate on the general 
meetings to have their opinions represented in different cases. 
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Graph 11 - General meetings 
 
The measure of sufficiency of the information for the analysts is divided equally 
on three and four with 50% on each. This indicates that it is relative sufficient for 
the respondents  
 
Graph 12 - General meetings 
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4.3.7 Chapter 7: Nomination Committee 
NCGB recommends that the company should have a nomination committee and 
that the general meeting should stipulate guidelines for the duties of the 
nomination committee. The majority of the committee should be independent of 
the board of directors and executive personnel. The nomination committee should 
not include the company`s chief executive or any other executive personnel 
(Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 2010). 
The majority of the respondents find this valuable for their analysis of a company. 
 
Graph 13 - Nomination commitee 
 
The information seems to be relative sufficient for the respondents that found it 
valuable with over 60% on value four.  
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Graph 14 - Nomination committee 
 
The respondents that did not find the information valuable have answered that 
“they assume sound practice in this case and as long as the company follow 
general practice on this matter, this does not need to be stated in the 
information”. This means that some of the respondents that did not find the actual 
written information that companies provide may find it valuable that the company 
have a nomination committee.  
 
4.3.8 Chapter 8: Corporate Assembly and Board of Directors: Composition 
and Independence 
The composition of the corporate assembly should be determined with a view to 
ensuring that it represents a broad cross-section of the company`s shareholders. 
The composition of the board of directors should ensure that the board can attend 
to common interests of all shareholders and meets the company’s need for 
expertise, capacity and diversity. That it can operate independently of any special 
interest. The majority of the shareholder-elected members of the board should be 
independent of the company’s executive personnel and business conducts. The 
board of directors should not include executive personnel. The annual report 
should provide information about the independency of the members of the board 
of directors. The term of office for members of the board of directors should not 
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be longer than two years at a time. The annual report should provide information 
to illustrate the expertise of the members of the board of directors, and 
information on their record of attendance at board meetings. Members of the 
board of directors should be encouraged to own shares in the company 
(Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 2010). 
 
This section has many recommendations concerning the corporate assembly, 
which is one of the unique features corporate structures in Norway, and the board 
of directors. The independence is one of the most important and maybe also the 
most discussed issue in this section. The respondents are divided equally whether 
this information is valuable or not.  
 
Graph 15 - Corporate assembly and board of directors: composition and independence 
 
The importance of the information for those that found it valuable seems to be on 
the upper end of the scale. The majority has answered four on the scale.  
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Graph 16 - Corporate assembly and board of directors: composition and independence 
 
 
It seems that the views concerning independence of board members are divided. 
The arguments for independent board members are stated in the codes and are 
mentioned above (chapter 2.4). The arguments against independence are that the 
members do not have the required knowledge and expertise of the operations in 
the company. 
 
The comments regarding this chapter of the codes were that; “this has little impact 
on valuation, that all listed on the stock exchange followed the regulations and 
that the board usually were diversified”. The interpretation of this answer may be 
that since all the listed companies follow the regulations, the board structure does 
not matter since they follow the regulations anyway. This does not prevent the 
possibility of agency costs. Even if they follow the rules, the agent may make bad 
decisions such that the investor/owner loses money. The importance of an 
independent board of director is that it may work as a monitoring organ. They will 
not have personal interest, only if they have shares in the company, hence they 
will act in the best sense for the company.  
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4.3.9 Chapter 9: The Work of the Board of Directors 
This chapter concerns the work of the board of directors. The board of directors 
should issue instructions for its own work as well as for the executive managers. 
They should not act as the company`s audit committee and they should provide 
details in the annual report of any board committees appointed. They board of 
directors should also evaluate its performance and expertise annually (Norwegian 
Corporate Governance Board 2010). 
 
The last recommendation is widely discussed, whether the board of directors 
should evaluate its own performance and expertise or whether some others should 
evaluate the board. The respondents are divided in their views on whether this 
information provides is valuable for their analysis or not.   
 
Graph 17 - The work of the board of directors 
The importance of the work of the board of directors and how it is done is 
valuable for half of the respondents, but the comments that are submitted by the 
other half indicates that they assume that the work is done properly. One 
respondent said that “This is irrelevant for valuation; it is considered that the 
board of directors is doing their tasks according to the corporate law in Norway.” 
Another respondent says that it has “a low impact on the running operations and 
more impact on mergers and acquisitions”. 
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The sufficiency of the information has a range from two to five on the scale; with 
the majority on four meaning that the information is sufficient. The credit analyst 
did not find the information very sufficient even if it was valuable for the analysis 
work. 
 
Graph 18 - The work of the board of directors 
 
4.3.10 Chapter 10: Risk Management and Internal Control 
The board of directors must ensure that the company has sound internal control 
and system for risk management that are appropriate in relation to the extent and 
nature of the company’s activities. The board of directors should carry out an 
annual review of the company’s most important areas of exposure to risk and its 
internal control arrangements (Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 2010). 
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Graph 19 - Risk management and internal control 
 
This chapter was expected to have information that was valuable for the credit 
analysts, and both the analysts found it valuable. This is probably because of the 
reasons mentioned in the chapter about agency theory (chapter 2.3); the creditors 
have a potential downside which is high and a limited upside. The more 
interesting findings were that the credit analysts did not find the information very 
sufficient for their work. This may indicate that the information presented by the 
companies is not comprehensive enough or that they get better information 
directly from the source that needs credit. The majority of the investment analysts 
did not find the information valuable.  
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Graph 20 - Risk management and internal control 
 
The comments from the investments analysts were that “This is irrelevant for 
valuation; it is considered that the board of directors is doing their tasks 
according to the corporate law in Norway.” This was the same comment 
regarding the board of directors as for the previous chapter. This indicates that the 
respondent trust that the board of directors do their job right and for the 
company`s best interest. Another response was that “it is too little information and 
that it is a question of trust.” The information was also regarded as irrelevant for 
the company valuation for one respondent.  
 
4.3.11 Chapter 11: Remuneration of the Board of Directors 
The remuneration of the board of directors should reflect the board’s 
responsibility, expertise, time commitment and the complexity of the company’s 
activities. The remuneration of the board of directors should not be linked to the 
company’s performance. The company should not grant share options to members 
of its board. Any remuneration in addition to normal directors’ fees should be 
specifically identified in the annual report (Norwegian Corporate Governance 
Board 2010). 
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The remuneration of the board of directors is in most cases straight forward. They 
usually receive a fixed remuneration to do the work. Regardless to this it should 
be important to report if the board of directors have a remuneration linked to the 
performance of the company. This information seems valuable for the majority of 
the analysts.  
 
Graph 21 - Remuneration of the board of directors 
 
The analysts find this very sufficient with 50% answering four on the scale an 
about 25% answering five, making this a total of 75%.  
The comments to this chapter were that; “it has low impact on valuation, many 
board members are shareholders thus the remuneration is performance based”. 
The corporate governance codes actually recommends in chapter eight that the 
board should own shares in the company. This is because the board members 
should have interests in the company that they have invested privately. The 
meaning of this must be that they will act in the company`s best interest since they 
have shares in it. This is not the same as getting performance based remuneration 
such as options which links directly to performance.  
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Graph 22 - Remuneration of the board of directors 
 
4.3.12 Chapter 12: Remuneration of Executive Personnel 
The guidelines for the remuneration of the executive personnel should set out the 
main principles applied in determining the salary and other remuneration of the 
executive personnel. Performance-related remuneration of the executive personnel 
in the form of share options, bonus programs or the like should be linked to value 
creation for shareholders or the company’s earnings performance over time. 
Performance-related remuneration should be subject to an absolute limit 
(Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 2010). 
 
The remuneration for executive personnel is very different from the remuneration 
of the board of directors. It consists of complex options and other performance-
based remuneration and fixed remuneration. This is the most valuable part of the 
corporate governance codes for the analysts. Almost 80% found this information 
valuable. The remunerations of executive personnel are often very high and the 
bonus programs and options usually increase this significantly. In other words, 
money is directly taken out of the company. If executive personnel have an 
unreasonable high remuneration, options or bonus program; this may affect 
investors’ willingness to invest in the company.  
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Graph 23 - Remuneration of executive personnel 
 
Almost the whole scale is used when measuring the sufficiency of the 
information. Almost 60% have answered four and five together meaning that the 
information is highly sufficient. Over 25% have answering two which is very low. 
This may indicate that the information that the companies reports are too little 
comprehensive. Other sources that were used were the annual report, investor 
relations and management meetings. This may also be an indication that the 
information reported are not comprehensive enough.  
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Graph 24 - Remuneration of executive personnel 
 
4.3.13 Chapter 13: Information and Communications 
The company should publish an overview each year of the dates for major events 
such as its annual general meeting, publication of interim reports, public 
presentations, and dividend payment date if appropriate etc., at the same time as it 
is sent to shareholders (Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 2010). 
 
Graph 25 - Information and communications 
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This information seems very valuable for the credit analysts. Both found it 
valuable and both found the information very sufficient. Most of the analysts did 
also find the information valuable and the degree of sufficiency is also high. 
Clearly it is important companies publish an overview over major events. This can 
also be found from other sources such as company`s website. The respondents that 
did not find the information valuable answered that it is irrelevant for valuation 
and that they get the information from day to day in the investor relation 
calendar.  
 
Graph 26 - Information and communications 
 
4.3.14 Chapter 14: Take-Overs 
The board of directors should establish guiding principles for how it will act in the 
event of a take-over bid, and ensure that shareholders are treated equally. 
The board of directors should not seek to hinder or obstruct take-over bids for the 
company’s activities or shares unless there are particular reasons for this. 
If an offer is made for a company’s shares, the company’s board of directors 
should issue a statement making a recommendation as to whether shareholders 
should or should not accept the offer. The board should arrange a valuation from 
an independent expert (Norwegian Corporate Governance Board 2010). 
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Graph 27 - Take-Overs 
The majority of the investment analysts does find this information valuable, 
likewise do both the creditors. The sufficiency of the information for the 
respondents that found it valuable is relatively low.  This may indicate that the 
information provided is not comprehensive enough. This may be because of the 
difficulty of having a fixed strategy in the case of take-overs. The comments from 
the respondents do also indicate this. One of the responses was that “it is very 
seldom described how companies act to a takeover situation”.  
 
Graph 28 - Take-Overs 
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4.3.15 Chapter 15: Auditor 
The auditor should submit the main features of the plan for the audit of the 
company to the audit committee annually. The auditor should participate in 
meetings of the board of directors that deal with the annual accounts. The board of 
directors should hold a meeting with the auditor at least once a year at which 
neither the chief executive nor any other member of the executive management is 
present. The board of directors must report the remuneration paid to the auditor at 
the annual general meeting, including details of the fee paid for audit work and 
any fees paid for other specific assignments (Norwegian Corporate Governance 
Board 2010). 
 
Graph 29 - Auditor 
It does not seem important for most of the analysts that the auditor participate in 
meetings with the board of directors and provide a plan for their work. It should 
be important to report the specific fees paid to the auditors for their work. But 
some of the analyst seems not to trust what is being reported. Taken into account 
what happened with the accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP, who was one of 
the “Big Five”, in the Enron scandal, it should be vital that the transparency 
around the accounting firm is high. Over 55% of the respondents did not find this 
valuable but the sufficiency of the information is medium to high having almost 
70% of the respondents answering three and about 17% each on four and five. 
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There was several comments regarding this chapter and one of them was; “This 
gives a reassurance that an auditor has performed, but it could never be 
reassured of any fraud.” Another comment was that “it was not interesting for a 
valuation purpose”. The last comments did also regard fraud stating that; “the 
figures just have to be real according to laws or else it has little impact of 
valuation”. There seems to be a trust issue between what is actually reported and 
what is done in the real life. This should increase the importance of transparency 
concerning the work of the auditor. 
 
 
Graph 30 – Auditor 
 
4.3.16 Open Questions in the Survey 
The respondents were asked about potential improvements of the Corporate 
Governance Codes. The only response we received regarding this question was 
that the Code should implement the number of years that the auditor has audited 
the company. The respondents were also asked if they had comments regarding 
the Corporate Governance Codes. The responses to this question was; “Corporate 
Governance Codes is relatively meaningless when it comes to establishing a value 
of a public traded company.”, “Corporate Governance reporting is rarely used by 
analysts.” and “Corporate Governance is important, but it is more important how 
the company acts rather the standard statements listed in the report.” 
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4.4 Summary of the Survey 
The survey gave necessary input to the following in-depth interview, and issues 
that was raised in the survey were; the extent of use, which parts of the Code that 
have information value, the quality of the Code, deviation between actual practice 
and what was reported, potential improvements of the Code, alternative sources to 
the Code and the question of market confidence. According to the data from the 
following chapters was confirmed as valuable by the majority of the respondents; 
“equity and dividends”, “freely negotiable shares”, “Remuneration of executive 
personnel”, “information and communication” and “Take-overs”. According to 
our data the following chapters was declared not valuable by the majority of the 
respondents: “Auditor”, “General meetings”. The rest of the chapters had a 
relatively even distribution in comparison to the other chapters, which indicates 
that the information is not that valuable. These findings are highly relevant to 
pursue in the in-depth interviews, since they indicates that some parts are valuable 
for the analysts, and others are irrelevant for analysts, and might be costly 
information to provide for the companies without contributing to any information 
value for the users. In light of the submitted comments in the survey, the analysts 
seems relatively skeptical to whether to rely their analysis on the published 
corporate governance reports. It emerge that they do not consider corporate 
governance reports to be vital for their work, and that corporate governance 
reporting is somewhat minimum requirements that nevertheless is assumed to be 
acceptable in the first place. On issues that analysts do find interesting, the 
corporate governance reports seem not to be comprehensive enough, another 
specific comment that was submitted in the survey was improvements regarding 
the reporting on auditors’ engagement in companies. 
 
5.0 Qualitative Data from the In-Depth Interview 
5.1 The Use of Corporate Governance Reports in the Analytical Work 
The respondents from the in-depth interview were asked about their use of the 
corporate governance reports, and in which extend they use it in their analytical 
work.  
The investment analysts replies that they have a portfolio of listed companies that 
they follows continuously over time, and that they do not actively use the 
corporate governance reports as a primary source in their analytical work, which 
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is mainly corporate valuation. The investments analysts are pursuing the relevant 
value drivers in a narrow scope, thus they are focusing on new information or 
changes in the firm specific developments, industry developments or macro 
figures. However, it seems like they consider corporate governance to be 
important fundament and in some cases essential to their analytical work. One of 
the investment analysts consider corporate governance reports to be an mandatory 
statement from the company that he do not use time on the reports, and only seek 
such sources if there is suspect aspects or public known issues related to the 
corporate governance of a company. The analysts do have more trust when it 
comes to Norwegian companies’ corporate governance than foreign companies in 
their portfolio, and this might be an evidence of a more comprehensive 
compliance of good practice of corporate governance in the Norwegian market.  
The two institutional investors use the corporate governance reports more actively 
and systematic in their analytical work and integrates the reports as an indicator in 
their judgment of corporate performance, nevertheless as a tool to evaluate the 
management and board performance. The corporate governance structure is 
evaluated by analyzing the report and is an essential document for the institutional 
investors ahead of general meetings and NCGB’s code of practice are used as a 
guideline for voting on general meetings in companies the institutional investor 
are investors in.  
 
5.2 The Priority and Importance of the Different Parts in the Corporate 
Governance Codes 
The interviewees were asked about which part of the Code they uses, and which 
parts in specific they consider as valuable for their work. The Respondents had the 
Corporate Governance Code physical in front of them, in order to clearly identify 
the particular parts they find valuable.  
The investment analysts do not use any specific part in general, but use elements 
as needed in analysis of certain companies.  
The first institutional investor state that he uses specific parts in the report more 
than other and his emphasis in his analytical work is mainly on general meeting 
issues, mandate and authorization to the board, remuneration for executive 
personnel, election of board of directors and nomination committee. The other 
institutional investor emphasised remuneration for board of directors, 
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remuneration for executive personnel, incentive schemes, general meetings, 
independence of members of the board of directors and composition of the board 
of directors. Overall, the two institutional investors have a rather corresponding 
focus in relation to assessment of the different elements in the corporate 
governance reports.  
 
5.3 The Quality of the Corporate Governance Reports Published by Listed 
Companies 
The respondents were asked about their opinion about the quality of the corporate 
governance reports that the listed companies publishes. They were also asked if 
the quality differs systematically in relation to particular characteristics with the 
companies, such as size, ownership, experience and other unique features.  
According to the investment analysts the quality varies somewhat, and they 
consider it to be an issue of resources for the companies, since financial strong 
corporations tend to have more comprehensive reports than smaller and financial 
weaker companies.  
One of the institutional investor claims that the Norwegian listed companies 
generally have high quality on their corporate governance reports, and he 
emphasise that if a company chose to explain instead of comply does not 
necessarily mean that the quality of the corporate governance report is low, hence 
differing from the codes does not reduce the quality of the report. In specific some 
elements in the reports are often of low quality, such as remuneration of executive 
personnel, bonuses, pension schemes and options, but the rest is often of higher 
quality.  
The other institutional investor claims that the corporate governance reports are 
significantly varying in quality and there are generally large potential for quality 
improvement of the reports. The focus should be on reporting information that is 
valuable for the shareholders, and omitting irrelevant information in the report. 
There is also a significant difference between Norwegian companies listed on 
Oslo Stock Exchange and foreign companies listed on Oslo Stock Exchange, since 
these companies often have complied codes from country of origin that is less 
comprehensive, and in some cases the reports does not contain any relevant 
information. The most common exception is American companies listed on Oslo 
Stock Exchange, because the corporate governance report is often of high quality 
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for US companies. A specific issue of bad corporate governance is reporting of 
bonus schemes that make it difficult to compare periodical bonus payments, since 
certain companies’ does report the actually paid bonuses and not how much bonus 
that is incurred. The quality is basically correlated to financial strength and 
experience, but there are many exceptions where small inexperienced companies 
have high quality on their corporate governance reports.   
 
5.4 Potential Improvement of the Corporate Governance Code 
The interview respondents were asked about potential improvements or additional 
recommendations that would be valuable for them in their analytical work. 
The first institutional investor emphasise that all companies should have 
nomination committee, in other terms it should not be optional to choose to have a 
nomination committee or not, consequentially the requirement of nomination 
committee should be incorporated in the Norwegian Corporate Law. In relation to 
the composition of the nomination committee the corporate governance codes 
should recommend that all the members have to be independent of board of the 
directors, corporate assembly and the committee of representatives. However, the 
nomination committee should cooperate closely with the board of directors and 
chairman of the board. In relation to additional extraneous topics that is not 
strictly related to corporate governance should not be included in the corporate 
governance report, such as corporate social responsibility, so the corporate 
governance report does not get to diluted with irrelevant information that is 
without information value in a analysis of the corporate governance of a company. 
The management remuneration statement is included in the corporate governance 
codes and in the Norwegian Corporate Law, but the companies does not report 
this in a satisfactory manner.  
The second institutional investor emphasise that corporate values and ethical 
guidelines is very important in the analytical work, and on these matters the codes 
are too vague, and consequentially the companies are not thorough enough in the 
corporate governance reports on these issues. The reporting on severance 
packages is often inadequate, since the policy and duration frequently is omitted 
in the reports because the recommendation does not require that companies 
publish a detailed overview on severance packages in the corporate governance 
reports. The Corporate Governance Code is supplemented with an internal 
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guideline/best practices statement that draws a more precise corporate governance 
structure. The purpose is on one side to use it as a voting guidelines for the 
institutional investor, and the on the other hand it represents a best practice 
indicator for the companies where the institutional investor are a significant 
shareholder. The Corporate Governance Code should require that the companies 
have to report the cost of a capital increase with issuing new shares in the 
financial markets, because the commissions the company pays are often very high, 
and the shareholders will find it highly relevant in relation to determine the 
cost/benefit of capital increase, hence it should be comprehensively presented in 
the corporate governance reports. The companies should visualize the costs 
connected to different incentives schemes and share programs for the management 
and the CEO.  
The first investment analyst calls for a own topic in the corporate governance 
codes where the company must state historical information about any kind of 
conflicts of interest that have led to legal law suits between shareholder, and in 
particular conflicts of interest between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders. The purpose of this historical overview in the corporate governance 
reports is so that potential investors are informed about earlier legal conflicts that 
might be relevant in the pricing of the company if the conflict could occur again.  
The second investment analyst does not want to improve the corporate governance 
codes by adding other elements, since the reports not are used in his analytical 
work.  
5.5 Deviation between Actual Practice and the Corporate Governance Reports 
We asked the interview objects about their opinion about the relation between 
companies’ actual practice and what they claim in the corporate governance 
reports. 
The first institutional investor claims that the market is transparent enough to 
detect if there are major differences in the actual practice and what is reported, 
and good leadership will be rewarded and bad leaders will be replaced.  
The second institutional investor believes that the majority of what is reported 
complies with the actual practice for most companies. Norwegian companies in 
general are often more governed by the administration/management, rather than 
by the board of directors, as the Annual Report usually claims. A typical example 
of deviation between actual practice and reporting is that no company would 
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admit in the corporate governance report that they are paying the highest salaries 
in the market, even though many of them are.  
The first investment analyst claims that there are significant differences between 
actual practice and what is reported by some companies. The market transparency 
is high and the market is so efficient that bad corporate governance will 
immediately affect the pricing in the market.  
The second investment analyst believes that there are significant deviation on 
actual practice and the corporate governance reports. Any company could claim to 
be shareholder-friendly; however the reality is reflected in the share price.  
5.6 Alternative Sources  
To reveal if the analysts use other sources to supplement their analytical work 
related to the corporate governance reports, the question about alternative or 
additional sources was asked in the survey, and the findings from the survey was 
used to check if the interview objects seeks alternative sources in their work.  
The first institutional investor use publically sources such as Annual Report, but 
supplement with meetings with the management where direct inquiries about 
corporate governance are addressed. 
The second institutional investor uses the Annual Report and an external supplier 
of information analysis that goes through the corporate governance reports, and 
meetings with the management of the companies. However, the timespan between 
the publishing of the corporate governance reports and the general assembly is 
short; nevertheless meetings are not preferable since it is a time-consuming 
process to get access to information. The corporate governance reports are the 
main source in the analytical work. In some cases direct inquiries occurs to the 
companies in certain circumstances where specific information is required to the 
analytical work.  
The first investment analyst use SEC Filings as an additional source for US 
companies that are listed on Oslo Stock Exchange. In some cases agreements 
between shareholders and the companies that relates to corporate governance 
issues is taken into consideration in cases where they are not presented in the 
corporate governance report. If there is a large corporate shareholder that have 
significant control of the company, it might be appropriate to look into the 
shareholders own Annual Report and corporate governance report. In several of 
the listed companies in the Norwegian market the government is a significant 
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owner, and then it is important to take into consideration The Norwegian 
Government’s Ownership Policies.  
5.7 The Corporate Governance Report Ability of Establishing Market 
Confidence 
In order to reveal if the corporate governance reports contribute to market 
confidence for the reporting companies, the respondents were asked about their 
opinion about market confidence-effects in relation to corporate governance 
reporting. 
The first institutional investor finds the corporate governance reports as essential 
for the companies to gain market trust and confidence, and companies that 
systematically work toward complying to the codes are sending an important 
signal to the market, that over time will reinforce the market confidence.  
The second institutional investor believes that the corporate governance reports 
creates market confidence, and the codes are essential to force the companies to 
do a proper reporting and complying to the recommendation, and the market 
confidence would most certainly be worse if the companies did not have the 
corporate governance codes to comply to.  
The first investment analyst suggests that in the Nordic countries it is very seldom 
that the corporate governance reports leads to distrust in the markets.  
The second investment analyst considers the corporate governance reports to be 
compulsory formalities and have no trust-making effect in the market.  
5.8 Statements from the Survey and the In-Depth Interview about the Effect of 
the Corporate Governance. 
The interview objects were asked about their opinion about a statement generated 
from the survey that is inspired from the psychology about work motivation, 
where the theory suggests that hygiene at the work place does not trigger 
motivation, but rather avoid demotivation (Herzberg, Mausner og Snyderman 
1959). Analogous to this theory, we asked the following question: 
“Does the corporate governance reports generate trust or confidence in the 
market, or does it only contribute to avoid distrust?” 
The first institutional investor was confident in the markets positive perception of 
the corporate governance reports and its ability to generating trust and confidence 
in the market.  
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The second institutional investor believes that this is a statement that generally 
could be true for many types of reporting that companies do, but in particular this 
do not apply for the corporate governance reports. The main reason is that the 
Code forces them to take active decisions regarding issues that are admitted to the 
general assembly. The companies that take the corporate governance reporting 
seriously and use it for actively communicating with the market achieve a higher 
degree of confidence in the market. In particular the market could expect more 
comprehensive corporate governance reporting from companies where the 
government is a large shareholder. Start-up companies that are in excessive 
growth are more likely to have a less comprehensive corporate governance report, 
and this is often influencing the market confidence.  
The first investment analyst considers that in general, listed companies in Norway 
could be described with the statement, since they avoid distrust rather than gain 
trust in the market.  
The second investment analyst admits that he does not find the corporate 
governance reports useful, thus it does not create trust, but at the other hand fully 
lack of reporting on corporate governance would create distrust.  
5.9 Information Value in Relation to the Frequency of Reporting 
The interview objects were asked if a more frequently reporting on corporate 
governance would increase the information value for their analytical work, and 
how potential implementation of an increased frequency of reporting could be 
executed. 
The first institutional investor did not believe that an increase of reporting on 
corporate governance would give any additional value for the analytical work. 
Publication annually is reasonable, nevertheless these reports are resource- and 
time consuming for the companies to develop.  
The second institutional investor did not consider that a more frequent reporting 
would contribute to more information value for the analytical work in a longer 
perspective, because a more frequent reporting might lead to a more short-term 
thinking. 
The first investment analyst does not find a more frequent reporting valuable for 
the analytical work, and it is necessary to limit the information flow somewhat. If 
a company have major changes in the corporate governance structure for quarter 
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to quarter it is a bad signal, but complementation of the report on significant shifts 
in the corporate governance structure would be valuable.  
The second investment analyst consider a more frequent reporting as non-valuable 
reporting, and corporate governance published in quarterly reports would just be 
skipped by analyst, hence more frequent reporting would have no additional 
information value. The time of publishing of the corporate governance is coincide 
with the Annual Report with its voluminous content, and the corporate 
governance report drowns in all the information, so the corporate governance 
report should be published more isolated on another time than the Annual Report. 
It is fair to say that the corporate governance report is not time-critical 
information. 
5.10 Business-Specific Corporate Governance Code 
The interview objects were asked if changing the Code to a more business- and 
industry-specific character would improve the Code and increase information 
value. 
The first institutional investor believes that a universal corporate governance code 
in a “one-size-fits-all” format is better, and the Norwegian Corporate Law 
captures issues that could be related to industry-specific aspects, such as the 
financial sector where the laws regulate certain aspects in relation to the corporate 
governance.  
The second institutional investor considers a “one-size-fits-all” format as more 
efficient and desirable. 
The first investment analyst find it necessary that companies with unique industry 
specific features report on these issues, and it would be more information value in 
the reports if the companies reports more specific aspects related to the industry.  
The second investment analyst did not find any reason for the Code to be more 
industry-specific.  
 
5.11 Other Questions Derived from the Survey  
The interview objects was asked specific questions derived from the survey about 
potential improvements of the corporate governance codes in order extract 
thoughts about potential improvements that the interview objects did not generate 
themselves during the semi-structured interview session. In addition, the first 
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interview object had ideas to improvements of the codes that were introduced for 
the three last interview objects.  
1. Should the Corporate Governance Code provide information about the 
auditor’s services, such as duration of the engagement and policy of 
replacement of the auditor? 
2. Should the Corporate Governance Code provide historical information 
about lawsuits or legal disputes among the shareholders 
The first institutional investor considered the information about auditor 
replacement as interesting, and believes that a statement on these issues would be 
a valuable improvement of the Code. When it comes to lawsuits among the 
shareholders it is already publicly known information, and reporting on lawsuits 
of this kind would not be a valuable improvement of the Code. 
The second institutional investor considers information about auditor replacement 
as valuable information, and having a policy on auditor replacement is common, 
and transparency on auditor policy would be valuable. It should be more 
transparency about legal disputes, and a historical overview would be particularly 
helpful. 
The first investment analyst does find both positive and negative aspects with 
publishing information about replacement of auditor, but it would be appropriate 
to inform about replacement of the auditor. This interview object suggested the 
possibility of improving the Code with incorporate information about legal 
disputes.  
The second investment analyst considers it highly valuable to incorporate 
information about replacement of auditor and policy on auditor replacements. In 
relation to incorporate historical overview of legal disputes in the Code the 
interview object did not found it suitable, since this would be distinctively for the 
Norwegian Code, consequentially not desirable.  
 
6. 0 Research Findings and Conclusion 
In order to answer the research question, the data collection have aimed to reveal 
the information value of corporate governance reporting in a user-perspective, 
according to the data it appears that the different user-groups find different degree 
of information value. In general it seems like the two analyst groups, investment 
analyst and institutional investors, are divided in their perception of the value of 
corporate governance reporting, and use the reports differently. The institutional 
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investors use the corporate governance reports in a larger extent than the 
investment analysts. One reason could be that the institutional investors actually 
owns shares in the companies they analyse on behalf of their customers, while the 
investment analysts analyses the companies in order to provide their customers, 
that is potential shareholders in the company, with investment recommendations. 
This could be affecting the different groups in their access to supplementary 
information from the companies, and this is also confirmed by the data, since the 
data indicates that the institutional investors more often have directly 
communication with the companies they analyse. Institutional investors appear 
more satisfied with the corporate governance reports than the investment analysts, 
but in one particular case an institutional investors had developed additional 
corporate governance codes they recommend companies in their portfolio to 
implement. This is a signal that the Corporate Governance Code issued by NCGB 
is not comprehensive enough, and the data indicates overall that the Corporate 
Governance Code is a subject of potential improvements.  
The institutional investors are coherent in the importance of issues regarding 
remuneration of executive personnel, and find the reporting on these issues to be 
of too low quality. The costs associated with capital increase were another issue 
that was raised during the interview, and more comprehensive reporting on these 
issues would increase the information value.  
The data also propose that it could be done improvements to the Corporate 
Governance Code that would lead to higher degree of information value for the 
end-users. In particular, the in-depth interview revealed that the timespan from the 
release of the corporate governance reports (through companies’ annual reports) 
to the general meetings is short, and makes thorough analysis difficult because of 
lack of time. Other findings in the in-depth interview stated that the corporate 
governance reports do not contain time-critical information, and all the interview 
objects agreed that increased frequency on the reporting does not increase 
information value. According to some of the interview objects the corporate 
governance reports simply “drowns” in all the information published in the annual 
reports provided by the companies. These findings raised the question whether if 
the corporate governance reports should be published in the annual reports, since 
the information value might be increased for the users if the corporate governance 
information was published on a more suitable point of time. 
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It is clear that the different groups of users of corporate governance reports have 
different perception of the information value; however, it is obvious that their use 
of the reports is differing significantly, and this indicates that the different analysts 
groups use the reports in different decision processes. Future development of the 
Corporate Governance Code should define for whom the Code are developed, and 
in which way they should provide the different users with valuable information. It 
is many potential improvements that will increase the information value for large 
groups of users, nevertheless there are potential improvements that could be done 
that increase the information value for several groups of users.  
 
6.1 Criticism to own research 
The Thesis has been based on assumptions, limitations and simplifications that 
could be significant for our findings. Our assumption that the financial 
stakeholders in companies are fully represented by analysts is a simplification 
done to able us to collect data. If this simplification is adequate is an academic 
question that could be debated. Another question is if the method used in the 
Thesis is threatened by impartiality, since the corporate governance environment 
in Norway is small and it is possible that the interview objects have links to either 
NCGB or associations represented in NCGB. The Thesis is limited in relation to 
reveal the users’ perception of the information value of the corporate governance 
reports, since the chosen perspective does not give a holistic review of the 
information value for all users.  
6.2 Future research 
Our study does only attempt to explore some aspects of the information value of 
corporate governance reports; nevertheless it remains overwhelmingly much 
research to do on these issues. The development of the Code has perhaps lack of 
academic research or evaluation. Other perspectives and approaches could be 
desirable to use in future research. Future research can identify the benefits in 
relation to the associated costs of producing such corporate governance reports, 
and might answer if the corporate governance reporting is justified.  
Master Thesis in GRA 19003  01.09.2012 
Page 61 
 
Bibliography 
ABG Sundal Collier. Annual Report. 2011. 
http://www.abgsc.se/Global/Annual%20Reports/ASC%20Annual%20Rep
ort2011.pdf (accessed 07 11, 2012). 
Aguilera, Ruth V., and Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra. “Codes of Good Governance 
Worldwide: What is the Trigger?” Organizational Studies, 2004: 417-446. 
Akkermans, Dirk, et al. “Corporate Governance in the Netherlands; An Overview 
of the Application of the Tabaksblat Code in 2004.” Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 11 2007: 1106-1118. 
Arcot, Sridhar, Valentina Bruno, and Antoine Faure-Grimaud. “Corporate 
governance in the UK: Is the comply or explain approach working?” 
International Review of Law and Economics, 2010: 193-201. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Hollis, Daniel W. Collins, and Ryan LaFond. “The effects of 
corporate governance on firms` credit ratings.” Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 2006: 203-243. 
Bhagat, Sanjai, and Bernard Black. Leeds School of Business. 02 2000. 
http://leeds-faculty.colorado.edu/Bhagat/bb-022300.pdf (accessed 06 25, 
2012). 
Bhagat, Sanjai, and Brian Bolton. “Sarbanes.Oxley: Governance and 
Performance.” Social Science Research Network. 17 03 2009. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1361815 (accessed 06 
25, 2012). 
Carnegie. Analysis. 2012. 
http://www.carnegie.se/no/no/Verdipapirhandel/Verdipapirhandel/Analyse
/Virksomhet/ (accessed 07 11, 2012). 
Carnegie Holding AB. “Annual Report.” 2011. 
http://www.carnegie.se/DocGlobal/IR/carnegie%20%C3%85R%20SV%2
0RGB%20120516.pdf (accessed 07 11, 2012). 
Cheung, Yan-leung, J. Thomas Connelly, Piman Limpaphayom, and Lynda Zhou. 
“Do Investors Really Value Corporate Governance? Evidence from the 
Hong Kong Market.” Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting, 05 2007: 86-122. 
Master Thesis in GRA 19003  01.09.2012 
Page 62 
Chhaochharia, Vidhi, and Yaniv Grinstein. “Corporate Governance and firm 
value: The impact of the 2002 governance rules.” The journal of finance, 
2007: 1789-1825. 
Chizema, Amon. «The Influence of Ownership Structure on the Implementation 
of National Codes of Corporate Governance: Development of Research 
Propositions.» International Journal of Management, 2011: 238-253. 
Claessens, Stijn, and Sir Adrian Cadbury. 2003. 
http://www.gcgf.org/wps/wcm/connect/7fc17c0048a7e6dda8b7ef6060ad5
911/Focus_1_Corp_Governance_and_Development.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
(accessed 08 23, 2012). 
Creswell, John W., and Vicki L. Plano Clark. Designing and conducting mixed 
methods research. California: Sage Publications, Inc., 2007. 
Creswell, John W. Educational research-planning, conducting, and evaluating 
quantitative and qualitative research. New Jersey: Pearson Education 
Ltd., 2005. 
Cromme, Gerhard. «Corporate Governance in Germany and the German 
Corporate Governance Code.» Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 19 05 2005: 362-367. 
Davies, Adrian. Best practice in corporate governance. Aldershot: Gower 
Publishing Limited, 2006. 
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. “The iron cage revisited: Institutional 
isomerphism and collective rationality in organizational fields.” American 
Sociological Review, 04 1983: 147-160. 
Earnst & Young. “Gorporate Governance 2011.” 2011. 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Corporate_Governance-
undersokelsen_2011/$FILE/Corp%20Governance%202011_WEB_final.p
df (accessed 06 12, 2012). 
European Corporate Governance Institute. Index of codes. u.d. 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php (funnet 01 11, 2012). 
Feleaga, Niculae, Dragomir Voicu, and Liliana Feleaga. “Corporate Governance 
Codes: are They Fresh or Trite.” The Academy of Economic Studies of 
Bucharest, Romania, 11 2009: 30-37. 
Garcia-Meca, Emma, and Juan P. Sanches-Ballesta. “The association of board 
independence and ownership concentration with voulentary disclosure: a 
meta-analysis.” European Accounting Review, 2010: 603-627. 
Master Thesis in GRA 19003  01.09.2012 
Page 63 
Government Pension Fund of Norway . Statens Pensjonsfond Norge. 2012. 
http://www.ftf.no/no/c-18-Statens-pensjonsfond-Norge.aspx (accessed 07 
11, 2012). 
Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Michael S. Weisbach. “The effects of board 
composition and direct incentiveson firm performance.” Financial 
Management, 1991: 101-112. 
Herzberg, Fredrick, B. Mausner, og B. B. Snyderman. The Motivation to Work. 
New York: John Wiley, 1959. 
Jensen, Michael C., og William H. Meckling. «Theory of the firm: Managerial 
behavio, agency costs and ownership structure.» Journal of Financial 
Economics 3, 1976: 305-360. 
KLP. About us. 2012. https://www.klp.no/om-klp/fakta/organisasjon (accessed 07 
11, 2012). 
Kragh-Schwarz, Maja. «Comply or explain - virker det?» Nordisk tidsskrift for 
selskabsrett, nr. 4 (2007): 94-108. 
Lovdata. Lov om Allmennaksjeselskaper. n.d. http://www.lovdata.no/all/tl-
19970613-045-019.html#4-16 (accessed 06 14, 2012). 
Lucia, Kolozsi, and Durgheu Liliana. “National Experience Regarding Corporate 
Governance - "Proper Practice" Codes.” The Journal of the Faculty of 
Economics - Economic, 12 2010: 578-583. 
Nordberg, Donald. Corporate Governance principles and issues. London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd., 2011. 
Norwegian Corporate Governance Board. About: NUES. n.d. 
http://www.nues.no/English/About_NUES/ (accessed 07 25, 2012). 
—. Anbefaling: Eng. 21 10 2010. 
http://www.nues.no/filestore/Anbefaling_Eng_2010.pdf (accessed 02 17, 
2012). 
—. Corporate Governance Abroad. u.d. 
http://www.nues.no/English/Corporate_governance_abroad/ (funnet 07 25, 
2012). 
—. The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance. u.d. 
www.nues.no/English/ (funnet 07 24, 2012). 
—. What is Corporate Governance? u.d. 
http://www.nues.no/English/What_is_Corporate_Governance+/ (funnet 07 
23, 2012). 
Master Thesis in GRA 19003  01.09.2012 
Page 64 
Oslo Stoch Exchange. Regelverk: Børssirkulær. 09 12 2002. 
http://www.oslobors.no/Oslo-Boers/Regelverk/Boerssirkulaerer/5-2002-
Corporate-Governance (funnet 01 12, 2012). 
Oslo Stock Exchange. “Circular No.2.” 25 01 2006. 
http://www.nues.no/filestore/Circular2-2006.pdf (accessed 06 12, 2012). 
Oslo Stock Exchange. Continuing obligations of stock exchange listed companies. 
Rules, Oslo: Oslo Børs, 2012. 
Oslo Stock Exchange. Listing Rules for equities on Oslo Børs. Rules, Oslo: Oslo 
Stock Exchange, 2012. 
—. Regelverk: børssirkulær. 01 12 2005. http://www.oslobors.no/Oslo-
Boers/Regelverk/Boerssirkulaerer/7-2005-Nye-boersregler-om-opptak-av-
aksjer-grunnfondsbevis-og-obligasjoner-samt-loepende-forpliktelser-for-
utstedere (funnet 01 12, 2012). 
Pae, Jinhan, and Tae Choi. “Corporate Governance, Commitment to Business 
Ethics, and Firm Valuation: Evidence from the Korean Stock Market.” 
Journal of Business Ethics, 05 2011: 323-348. 
Quick, Reiner, and Daniela Wiemann. “The quality of corporate governance 
reporting - empirical evidence from Germany.” Advances In Management, 
2011: 29-42. 
Rosenstein, Stuart, and Jeffrey G Wyatt. “Outside directors, board independence 
and shareholder wealth.” Journal of Financial Economics, 1990: 175-191. 
Shaffer, Gregory C., and Mark A. Pollack. “Minnesota law review.” Hard vs. Soft 
Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International 
Governance. 2010. http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/ShafferPollack_MLR.pdf (accessed 06 19, 2012). 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. “A survey of corporate governance.” The 
Journal of Finance, 1997: 737-783. 
Skjærseth, Jon Birger, Olav Schram Stokke, and Jørgen Wettestad. “Soft Law, 
Hard Law, and Effective Implementation of International Environmental 
Norms.” Global Environmental Politics, 2006: 104-120. 
Strøm, Reidar Øystein. «Independence and incentives.» Beta, 2008: 22-39. 
Tirole, Jean. «Corporate Governance.» Econometrica, 2001: 1-35. 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. «About: Laws.» www.sec.gov. 30 07 
2002. http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf (funnet 01 12, 2012). 
Master Thesis in GRA 19003  01.09.2012 
Page 65 
WebFinance Inc. Definition: Information. u.d. 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/information.html (funnet 07 
25, 2012). 
Xie, Biao, Wallace N. Davidson, and Peter J. DaDalt. “Earnings management and 
corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee.” 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2003: 295-316. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master Thesis in GRA 19003  01.09.2012 
Page 66 
Appendix  
Appendix 1 – Corporate governance codes 
  
(Source: (European Corporate Governance Institute u.d.)) 
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Appendix 2 – Topics in the Norwegian Corporate Governance Code 
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